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JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
Arthur D. Hellman*
No matter how judges are selected, sooner or later some unfortunate candidate
will be labeled a "judicial activist." One has to wonder: Does the term have any
identifiable core meaning? Or is it just an all-purpose term of opprobrium,
reflecting whatever brand of judicial behavior the speaker regards as particularly
pernicious?
That is the question I will address at this Symposium. Implicit in the question
are several important issues about the role of courts in our democratic society. I
offer my comments somewhat tentatively, because I know that scholars whom I
respect hold different views. At the least, I hope to clarify the various usages and
provide a framework that will permit debate about the underlying issues to take
place in a more coherent way.
I
The conventional way of presenting a thesis of this kind would be to take you
through the various meanings endorsed by others and to explain why each of
them is hopelessly flawed. At the end, triumphantly, I would offer my own perfectly crafted and calibrated definition.
In this instance, however, I think it will be more useful to put my cards on the
table at the outset. I take my definition from Judge Richard Posner, whose book
on the federal courts has a lengthy chapter on "federal judicial self-restraint,"
which he contrasts with "judicial activism."1 Judge Posner describes activist decisions as those that expand judicial power over other branches of the national government or over state governments. 2 I would speak a bit more broadly and say
that judicial activism is judicial review with an outcome adverse to the result
reached through the political process. 3
Several aspects of this definition deserve emphasis. First, although Judge
Posner was examining the work of the federal courts (and particularly the United
States Supreme Court), activism and restraint are also issues for state judicial
systems. In fact, in recent years some of the boldest ventures in judicial activism
have come in the decisions of state judges. Many of the examples are familiar:
* Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. This article
is based on remarks delivered at the Symposium on Judicial Selection at the Mississippi College School of Law on
November 8, 2001. I am grateful to the Mississippi College School of Law for the opportunity to participate in
this program. The article retains the conversational style of the lecture, adding only a minimum of footnoting. The
author thanks Professor James Weinstein for helpful comments on an earlier draft - while absolving him of any
responsibility for what remains.
1. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 314 (1996).
2. More accurately, Judge Posner describes "judicial self-restraint" as "the judge's trying to limit his court's
power over other government institutions." POSNER, supra note 1, at 318. As I have indicated, "activism" and
"self-restraint" are correlatives.
3. The political process includes not only acts of the legislature and the executive but also direct action by the
electorate, such as state constitutional amendments and popular initiatives.
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State courts in California, Tennessee, Texas, and more than a dozen other
states have struck down the state's system of financing education as violatequal protection clauses or other provisions of the
ing state constitution
4
state constitution.
*

Tort reform legislation in Ohio, Illinois, Oregon, and other states has been
held unconstitutional by state courts.'

*

The Vermont Supreme Court notoriously held that the state was "constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and
protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law." 6

*

The Florida Supreme Court invalidated an amendment to the state constitu- an amendment that
tion that was designed to preserve the death penalty
7
was approved by more than 70% of the voters.

So activism, in the sense endorsed by Judge Posner, is a feature of state as well
as federal judicial systems.
A second point about activism, as Judge Posner defines it, is that the definition
is indifferent to whether the decisions are liberal or conservative in outome. We
hear so much talk about "liberal activist judges" that we might conclude that
activist decisions always promote outcomes on the liberal side of the political
spectrum. That was generally true of Supreme Court in the 1960s under Earl
Warren and it was also true, to a surprising degree, of the Court in the 1970s and
early 1980s under Warren Burger.' Today, under Chief Justice Rehnquist, we
have another activist Court, but most of its activism is on the conservative side.
Mention of the Rehnquist Court brings up a third point, and also a possible
flaw, in Judge Posner's definition. Many of the most controversial decisions of
the current Court have struck down Acts of Congress on the ground that they
intruded on powers reserved to the states. These are certainly activist decisions if
viewed from the perspective of the national government, but they may also have
the effect of limiting judicial power over state governments.' However, the paradox is more apparent than real. The decisions do expand judicial authority over
the allocation of power among governmental units, and they reverse the outcome
of the political process. I have no doubt that Judge Posner would classify them as
activist, and I do also.' °
4. See Erin E. Buzuvis, Note, 'A "for Effort: Evaluating Recent State Education Reform in Response to
JudicialDemandsfor Equity andAdequacy, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 644,646 n.6 (2001).
5. See Mark Thompson, Letting theAir Out of Tort Reform, ABA J., May, 1997, at 64.
6. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
7. Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2000).
8. For example, it was the Burger Court that established a woman's constitutional right to an abortion, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); limited the circumstances under which the death penalty could be imposed, Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); and allowed prisoners to sue for medical malpractice that manifests "deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs," Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
9. Thus, when the Court held that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, it severely curtailed the extent to which federal courts would be second-guessing state agency employment decisions.
10. In the 1960s, Richard Nixon used the term "strict construction" as a synonym for what Judge Posner would
call "judicial self-restraint." See JAMEs F SIMON, IN His OwN IMAGE: THE SUPREME COuRT IN RICHARD NtxoN's
AMERICA 8-9 (1973). This was somewhat ironic, because the phrase originated as a way of describing judges who
"strictly" (i.e. narrowly) construed the powers of the national government. See, e.g., Newberry v. United States,
256 U.S. 232, 281 (1921) (Pitney, J., concurring in judgment but rejecting Court's holding of unconstitutionality)
(noting "deplorable result of strict construction"). Strict construction thus often translated into judicial activism,
for a narrow reading of national powers would readily result in holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional. See
Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court: JudicialActivism or Self-Restraint, 47 MD. L. REv. 125-26
(1987). For further discussion, see infra PartV.
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II
Let us look now at some of the other ways in which the term "activism" has been
used. It would be tedious to go through all of the permutations, so I will confine
myself to four. The first is exemplified by a comment made by a member of
Congress at a House hearing a few years ago. Here's what the Congressman said:
[T]he ultimate act of judicial activism is standing in a courtroom and having a
judge look down at you and call you .'nigger" and tell you that your client's
opinions in a case don't mean anything because your client happens to be black,
or tell the bailiff not to call you and tell you that your case is coming up for trial
and start the trial without you being there, simply because you represent an
interest that the judge is out of step with. That is the ultimate act of judicial
activism-acts which I have seen in my practice of law.11
We can all agree that the behavior described by the Congressman is appalling.
But if we attach the label "activism" to that conduct, we drain the term of all meaning. We can sympathize with the Congressman's anger, but we should not allow it
to distort our thinking.
In the same vein, but less extreme, is a comment a few years ago in the New York
Review of Books. The author referred to a judge "whose decision made begging (a
practice as old as recorded history) definitively illegal in the subways." He then
added: "Talk about judicial activism" 2
The first point about this comment is that the author criticizes thejudge for making begging "definitively illegal in the subways." Of course it was the city's legislative body that made begging illegal; what the judge did was to allow the political
process to work its will. The upshot is that the author has attached the label "judicial activism" to behavior that - in Judge Posner's terms at least (and also mine) is an example of judicial self-restraint, the very opposite of activism.
Perhaps we should not hold members of Congress and book reviewers to rigorous definitions, so let's move on to the academy. Consider these examples:
Further supporting this institutional view of slow change is the realization that a
Court can be characterized as "activist" after overruling six precedents in a
recent year. 3
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council is an activist decision because the
Court created a new rule of law. In the process, it badly distorted precedent."
Although [Justice Joseph R. Grodin] served on the California Supreme Court
during the tenure of Chief Justice Rose Bird, when one might have expected the
frequent revisiting of settled law, Justice Grodin's labor and employment decisions do not fit the mold of an activist engaged in judicial overreaching. In fact,
11. Hearing on H.R. 1252, the Judicial Reform Act of 1997, Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Propertyof the House Comm. on the Judiciary,105th Cong. 32 (1997) (statement of Rep. Mel Watt).
12. JAMEs LARDNER, CAN You BELIEVE THE NEW YORK MIRACLE, NEW YORK REviEW OF BooKs, Aug. 14, 1997,
at 54.
13. Erik Anderson, ConstitutionalizingChevron: Filling Up on Interpretive Equality,42 B.C. L. RE.. 349, 350
n.6 (2001).
14. Donald H. Ziegler, The NewActivist Court,45 AM. U. L. REv. 1367, 1370 (1996).
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in twenty-three reported labor and employment law decisions, Justice Grodin
wrote just once to overrule precedent and just once more to disapprove it. 5
These scholars are using the term "activism" to refer to a predilection for overruling precedent or changing the law established by prior decisions. 6 Now consider this variation, from an op-ed piece by Professor Chemerinsky: "the Reagan
and Bush Justices are engaged in aggressive conservative judicial activism, overruling more than half a century of precedents and invalidating important federal
statutes.""7
In a similar vein, Professor David O'Brien has referred to Justices who "appear
to share a conservative vision that opposes liberal legalism and lends itself to
judicial activism - activism whether in terms of overturning precedents or second-guessing elected representatives and the democratic process."''8 And Judge
(and former professor) Stephen Williams has written of a revived federalism that
would require "some 'activism' by the Supreme Court (in the senses both of
overturning precedents and of countermanding the political branches)."' 9
I suggest to you that it cannot be right to use the same term to describe a decision that overrules precedent and also a decision that rejects the outcome reached
by the political process. It is true that both can raise issues about the role of
courts and the operation of judicial review. But they are entirely different phenomena. And I hope it is self-evident that the question "When should a court
overrule one of its own decisions?" is not the same question as "When should a
court hold a statute or executive regulation or popular initiative unconstitutional?" The two categories of decisions would be measured against different benchmarks, and the mode of analysis should also be different.20
Lumping the two meanings together also produces anomalous results. For
example, Justice Clarence Thomas has urged the Supreme Court to reconsider
and perhaps overrule some of its precedents that recognize prisoners' rights
under the Eighth Amendment. Suppose that later this Term the Court is asked to
strike down a state statute that is alleged to violate the principles established by
those cases. Are we going to say that the Court is engaging in activism if it overrules the precedents - but that the decision is also activist if the Court adheres to
its precedents and holds the statute unconstitutional? Surely that cannot be right.
15. Christopher Cameron, No Ordinary Joe: Joseph R. Grodin and His Influence on California's Law of the
Worplace, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 253, 272 (2001).
16. The quoted comment about Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council is perhaps in a slightly different
mold, but "creat[ing] a new rule of law" is more akin to overruling precedent than to negating the outcomes
reached by the political branches.
17. Erwin Chemerinsky, Commentary,Perspective on Justice, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 18, 2000, at B-Il
(emphasis added). In fairness to Professor Chemerinsky, the reference to "activism" may be based solely on the
Justices' action in invalidating federal statutes; if so, this would be consistent with Judge Posner's definition.
However, the writers quoted in the text that follows plainly use the term to refer to decisions that overrule precedents as well as to decisions that overturn the results of the political process.
18. David O'Brien, Charting the Rehnquist Courts Course: How the CenterHolds, Folds, and Shifts, 40 N.Y.
L. SCH. L REv. 981, 988 (1996) (emphasis added).
19. Stephen Williams, Unconstitutional Conditions Through a Libertarian Prism, 1994 PuB. INT. L. REv. 159
(emphasis added) (Book Review, RicHAPo A. EPSTEIN,BARGAINING WITH THE STATE, 1993).
20. This is not to say that the two kinds of decisions have nothing in common. See infra Part VI.
21. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 861-62 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
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Unfortunately, there is no label in common use that describes the judge who
has a predilection for overruling precedent. The best I have come up with is to
say that such a judge is a "judicial radical," and that a disregard for precedent is
"judicial radicalism." I'm not satisfied with this terminology, and if someone can
come up with a better one, I hope you will let me know. But on one point I do
speak with confidence: overturning the results of the political process and overruling a court's own decisions are two entirely different kinds of judicial behavior. If we wish to have an intelligent discussion of the role of courts, we must
keep the two distinct.
III
Thus far I have been looking at what might be called casual uses of the term
"activism." But of course I am not the first scholar to attempt to define the phenomenon systematically. There are two efforts that are of particular interest
because, in different ways, they contrast sharply with the approach I am putting
forward here.
Several years ago, two political scientists published a book with the title
"Supreme Court Activism and Restraint.

'22

Among the contributors was one of

the participants in this conference, Professor Lino Graglia, who authored an
essay defending judicial restraint. Another contributor, Professor Bradley Canon,
offered an elaborate framework for the analysis of judicial activism. 23 He
described six dimensions which he suggested should be taken into account. One
of these, "majoritarianism," is essentially the equivalent of the unitary definition
championed by Judge Posner. Another is "interpretive stability," which includes
consideration of the judges' "alteration" of prior decisions. Still another is "interpretive fidelity," which Professor Canon defines as "the degree to which constitutional provisions are interpreted contrary to the clear intentions of their drafters
or the clear implications of the language used." Professor Canon applied his
framework to some prominent Supreme Court decisions and came up with "case
activism scores" ranging from zero to 0.83.
I respect this effort to dissect and quantify, but in the end I don't think it can
succeed. I doubt that people with widely different views about the role of courts
could agree on the relative weight to be given to the six "dimensions," let alone
the absolute values to be assigned in the evaluation of particular cases.
More recently, Professor Nelson Lund of George Mason Law School offered a
definition in a single sentence: "By judicial activism, I simply mean the practice
24
ofjudges substituting their own policy views for the law."
Professor Lund is not alone in defining judicial activism in this way. Judge
Laurence Silberman has offered an almost-identical definition, but in greater
detail. He said:
22. STEPHEN C. HALPERN & CHARLES LAMB, SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND REsTRAINT (1982).
23. Bradley C. Canon, A Frameworkfor the Analysis of JudicialActivism, in HALPERN & LAMB, supra note 22,
at 385.
24. Professor Lund spoke at a conference that was broadcast on C-Span. The discussion here is based on email correspondence with Professor Lund. I am grateful to Professor Lund for authorizing use of this material
here.
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Judicial activism simply means policymaking in the guise of interpreting and
applying law. Policy issues are those questions of public concern on which the
body politic or political institutions have free range of choice. When legislatures
or constitutional conventions make law, they resolve certain policy issues and
crystallize the majority view into rules. Of course, these rules are not on equal
footing: constitutional rules trump statutory rules. What is true for both is that,
if a judge exercises policy choice when deciding what these rules mean, that is
judicial activism.25
Professor Lund's straightforward characterization (even with the gloss provided by Judge Silberman) avoids the complexity of the multi-factor analytical
framework in the Canon paper, but I think it has two flaws that make it a good
deal less useful than the one endorsed by Judge Posner. It lacks a limiting focus,
and it incorporates a significant normative component.
As to the limiting focus: Those who talk about judicial activism generally are
not interested in the universe of judicial decisions; they are interested in decisions that rule on constitutional challenges to statutes, executive decisions, and
other products of the political process. In short, the focus is on the exercise of
judicial review. I think we are more likely to have a fruitful debate if we
acknowledge that fact and define the category accordingly.
But I fear that Professor Lund's formulation blurs the issues even more. I asked
Professor Lund if he would classify as activist a decision that upheld a statute
that was plainly unconstitutional. (Put aside, for the moment, how one would
make that determination.) Professor Lund responded: "That would definitely be
judicial activism as I understand it. In fact, in some ways it seems worse for a
judge to ignore the most fundamental laws that the people have adopted than to
ignore the less fundamental laws that the people's representatives have adopted."
I agree with Professor Lund that a judge who ignores the Constitution should
be condemned even more strongly than a judge who over-reads the Constitution
in order to impose his own policy views on the political branches. But I do not
think it is useful to use the same term to refer to both phenomena.
I say that in part for the same reason that I object to lumping together the rejection of precedent and the rejection of legislation. But there is also a deeper reason, and that brings me to the second flaw I see in Professor Lund's definition,
and Judge Silberman's as well. (It may also be present, to a lesser extent, in
Professor Canon's multi-factor framework.) I do not think any judge would ever
acknowledge that he or she has substituted his or her policy view for "the law."
Nor would a judge acknowledge making policy "in the guise of interpreting and
applying the law."
Necessarily, therefore, the label disputes the judge's own characterization of his
or her decision. This means that the definition includes a normative component,
and that an activist decision constitutes, almost by definition, a misuse of the
judge's authority.
25. Laurence H. Silberman, Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism?A Retrospective, 21 HARv. J. L.
& PUB. POL. 607, 618 (1998).
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I think it is preferable to separate the descriptive from the normative. There are
at least three reasons for this. First, by defining the phenomenon in objective
terms, we gain the opportunity - and indeed are compelled - to be explicitly and
candidly normative when we evaluate particular examples. This can be particularly beneficial at the stage of choosing the individuals who will serve on the
bench, whether through elections (including retention elections) or through a
process of appointment.
Second, when we limit the term "activism" to a phenomenon that is defined
objectively, it becomes much easier to identify judges who may indeed be, in
Professor Lund's words, "substituting their own policy views for the law." If a
judge is frequently activist in support of political liberalism, but practices selfrestraint when the challenger is on the conservative side, we have to wonder
whether the judge is following the law or his own policy preferences.
Finally - and this is perhaps the converse of the preceding reason - equating
"activism" with judicial overreaching has the effect (not intended, I'm sure) of
discrediting judicial review in those instances where it is salutary and legitimate.
I assume everyone here agrees that Marbury v. Madison and Martin v. Hunter'
Lessee are part of our system; 26 that the political process does not always stay

within constitutional boundaries; and that there are times when judicial intervention is appropriate and indeed necessary. We should avoid terminology that suggests otherwise.
IV
These last comments might seem like a natural lead-in to the next part of my
talk: distinguishing between the good and the bad in judicial activism. That is
indeed where I'm heading, but I also promised you the "ugly" side of judicial
activism, and I'd like to deal with that first.
Actually, I have to admit that the characterization is something of a misnomer
(for purposes of getting a catchy title), because this digression is about another
phenomenon that - like overruling - should be kept distinct from judicial
activism. I'm referring to judicial decisions that expand judicial power over
activities in the private sector. Once again Judge Posner has a helpful discussion,
and even a label; he refers to this as judicial intrusiveness."
An intrusive decision is a decision that shifts power, not from politically
responsive branches of government to the judiciary, but from private individuals
and entities to the government - in particular, the judicial branch. The Warren
Court exemplified judicial intrusiveness for its decisions that expanded the reach
of the antitrust laws. 28 The Burger Court behaved in a similar fashion in many of
its decisions on employment discrimination.
26. Professor Graglia may not agree with this point. See Lino Graglia, JudicialReview, Wrong in Principle,A
Disasterin Practice,21 MIss. C. L. REv. 243 (2002).
27. See POSNER, supra note 1.
28. Recall Justice Stewart's famous comment in dissent: "The sole consistency I can find is that in litigation
under § 7 [of the Clayton Act], the Government always wins." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,
301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Perhaps the most remarkable example is Utah Pub. Serv. Comm 'n v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969), in which the Court ordered a divesture even though all of the parties to the
case - including the United States - agreed that the case should be dismissed on other terms.
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Judicial intrusiveness takes different forms in state and in federal courts.
Federal courts expand their power over private individuals through expansive
interpretation of statutes (or occasionally executive regulations). State courts
sometimes rely on statutes, but more often their intrusive decisions are based on
common law principles.
Not everyone will see judicial intrusiveness - even if overdone - as something
we should worry about. After all, except in matters relating to sex and procreation, legislatures have almost unlimited power to regulate behavior in the private
sector. Judicial decisions based on statutory interpretation or on application of
common law principles can always be overruled by the legislature. Therefore (the
argument goes) we needn't be overly concerned about judicial intrusiveness,
because if the courts go too far the legislature can always correct them.
I think that that comfortable assumption rests on a naive view of the political
process. Almost invariably, intrusive judicial decisions, while restricting freedom
of action by one class of individuals, create new rights - or at least new opportunities - for another class. As long as that other class has representatives in the
legislature - and it generally will have - that makes it very difficult to overturn
the judicial ruling even if majority might support it. It's much easier to block legislation than to enact it. And even if there is no opposition, inertia and the press
of other business will stand in the way.
One example that comes to mind is a decision that - contrary to the general
run - could probably be classified as both activist and intrusive. In 1984, the
Supreme Court held in a case called Pulliam v. Allen that judicial immunity did
not bar an award of attorneys fees against state judges under the federal civil
rights statutes. State judges naturally asked Congress to reverse the decision.
There was no real opposition to the proposal, and the bar association supported
it, but getting it through both Houses was by no means easy. The Senate
Judiciary Committee favorably reported bills in the 100th, 101st, and 102nd
Congresses, but only on the fourth try was the legislation approved - as part of
an omnibus package of judiciary measures.
For myself, I would like to minimize intrusive decisions through adoption of a
"clear statement" requirement similar to the one the Supreme Court now follows
29
in determining whether Congress has abrogated state sovereign immunity. I
would like to see the courts - or better yet, Congress itself - say that no statute
should be read as imposing a new obligation on a class of individuals unless the
language in the statute is clear and specific enough that it would have alerted
30
members of the class to the nature of the obligation they would soon be facing.
29. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
30. Consider, for example, the courts' interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes
it unlawful for an "employer" to "discriminate" on the basis of race or sex "with respect to ... terms ... of employment," as making employers liable, under certain circumstances, for the existence of a "hostile environment" in the
workplace. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 E3d
917, 925-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (treating as an open question "whether a single instance of sexual harassment [could]
be sufficient to establish a hostile work environment"). The law generated by these decisions effected a substantial
alteration in employers' obligations, without debate or vote in Congress. For a brief account of the development of
the doctrine, see ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination:A Defective Paradigm,8 YALE
LAW & POL. REv. 333 (1990).
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Only if that test is satisfied can we be confident that the new obligation has truly
been imposed by the people's representatives and not by the judges.3 ' Further, by

resolving ambiguities in regulatory statutes in favor of the status quo, the Court
would allow the better-equipped political process to determine the nature and
32
extent of change as well as the limits of the new obligation.

To be consistent and even-handed, I would like to see the same rule of construction apply to claims that an Act of Congress has taken away rights enjoyed
33
by a class of individuals under state law.
Of course, nothing like that is going to happen, so I will end this detour into

the realm of judicial intrusiveness and return to my principal topic, judicial
activism.
V
I have argued that the term "judicial activism" should be used descriptively, to
refer to decisions that expand judicial power at the expense of institutions that
operate through the political process.3 The principal advantage of this approach,
I have suggested, is that it permits a more useful discussion of when activism is
legitimate and when it is not. It was my intention to turn at this point to articulat-

ing criteria for making that distinction.
Having now reviewed Professor Canon's work, with its careful and comprehensive delineation of six "dimensions" of activism, I am much less confident that
an analytical approach to the normative component can be pursued successfully.
Perhaps one can say - as Professor Canon does - that one particular decision is
more activist than some other. But that is very different from saying that either
decision is illegitimate or unjustified or "bad" in some other sense.
I also have some doubts as to whether this kind of analysis will alter anyone's
evaluation of particular activist rulings. I'm sure that many people in this room

31. More than 50 years ago, Justice Felix Frankfurter warned that "[j]udicial expansion of meaning beyond the
limits indicated ... enlists too heavily the private social and economic views of the judges." Felix Frankfurter,
Foreword: Symposium on Statutory Construction, 3 VAND. L. REv. 365, 368 (1950). Nowhere is this danger
greater than when the "[j]udicial expansion of meaning" allows a branch of the government - and in particular the
judiciary itself- to regulate private behavior that would otherwise remain free of governmental control.
Admittedly, the line between imposing a new obligation and construing an existing obligation will not
always be self-evident. But the fact that some instances of judicial creation of new duties will be difficult to identify until it is too late does not mean that the effort is not worthwhile. In any event, what I am suggesting is not so
much a rule as an attitude or mood. Cf Universal Camera Co. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1950) ("Congress [in
amending the provisions governing judicial review of NLRB decisions] expressed a mood.... As legislation that
mood must be respected, even though it can only serve as a standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid rules
assuring sameness of applications").
32. For this same reason, some courts have declined to impose new obligations through the vehicle of modifying common-law rules, even when the rules appear to have outlived their usefulness. See, e.g., Murphy v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983).
33. This latter suggestion has also been made by Professor Cass Sunstein. See Cass Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HAgv. L. REv. 405, 469 (1989) (endorsing "an interpretive principle requiring
a clear statement before judges will find federal preemption of state law."). Perhaps the principle should be limited
to "field[s] which the States have traditionally occupied." See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)
(distinguishing between such fields and "area[s] where there has been a history of significant federal presence").
34. It may well be that the word "activism" has become so hopelessly compromised that we should abandon it
altogether and substitute another word for the phenomenon I have described. Earlier in this article I referred to
"intervention" by judges. Perhaps we should describe decisions that expand judicial power over the political
process as "interventionist."
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think that "policymaking in the guise of interpreting and applying law" is exactly
what the Supreme Court was doing in its abortion decisions. Others - probably not
the same people - hold the same view of the Court's decisions on state sovereign
immunity. No analysis of activism in the abstract is likely to change these views.
Nevertheless, I have committed myself to the effort, and because we care so
much about our courts and the legitimacy of their decisions, there has to be some
value in trying to identify criteria that will enable us to distinguish between "the
good" and "the bad" in judicial activism. So I'll go ahead, but briefly. And I'll confine myself to the work of the United States Supreme Court.
The first criterion, of course, is how closely the ruling adheres to the constitutional text. That might seem like no more than stating the obvious, but it carries us
further than you might think. For example, the Supreme Court recently heard oral
argument on whether the First Amendment protects "virtual child pornography."
Whatever the answer to that question, the Constitution does protect freedom of
speech. 35 It does not protect "privacy." A decision that holds that a statute violates
"the right to privacy" must take a step that is not required when a decision finds an
impairment of the right to free speech.
At this point you might ask: What about the Supreme Court's decisions on state
sovereign immunity? These do not purport to be grounded in text, but instead
invoke Chief Justice Hughes' observation that "Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. 3 7 One response might be
that "inference from structure," as the late Professor Charles Black labeled it,3 has
been an accepted tool of constitutional interpretation since the days of Chief
Justice Marshall. But in the end I would have to say that an activist decision resting
on "postulates" or "presuppositions," as the Court's sovereign immunity decisions
do, is, for that reason alone, more suspect than one grounded in text.
At the same time, from a textualist perspective there is an important distinction
between activist decisions that limit the power of the national government and
activist decisions that limit the power of state governments. Ordinarily, judges can
restrict state power only by holding that some provision of the Constitution prohibits - however indirectly or imprecisely - the conduct in question. 9 But when an
exercise of federal power is challenged, the courts can also find that the statute or
regulation is invalid because nothing in the Constitution authorizes it. The primacy
of text takes on a very different coloration when the judges must find relevant constitutional language not to strike down a law but to uphold it."°
35. I assume that no one is prepared to dispute that works depicting children engaged in sexual activity fall
within the category of "speech."
36. A controversial example is, of course, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in which the Supreme Court
found that "[tihis right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
37. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934), quoted in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
729 (1999).
38. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
39. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that Qualifications Clauses of
the Constitution preclude states from imposing additional requirements for service in Congress).
40. By the same token, one must be careful in speaking of "unenumerated rights" against the federal government. Certainly examples of the phenomenon can be found. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment protects against a denial of equal protection by the United States. See, e.g.,
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979). But activist decisions may also rely, in a sense, on rejection of a government claim of unenumerated powers. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (holding that
Congress lacks power under Article I to subject a civilian ex-serviceman to trial by court-martial).
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A second criterion is history. I have in mind here a bit of dictum from Justice
Holmes - not as often quoted as some of his other observations: "If a thing has
been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong
case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it."4 1 Now, it is probably not often

that a challenged practice will have two hundred years of history behind it, but
the longer the history, and the closer you can bring it to the era that produced the
constitutional text, the more difficult it is to justify a court decision that overturns the practice. 2
The third criterion is the extent to which the court has imposed affirmative
obligations on the political branches. It is a familiar observation that our
Constitution is a "charter of negative liberties."4 3 The First Amendment, the

Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment - pretty much all of the constitutional provisions that are the basis of judicial review today - are couched as
prohibitions. When a court takes prohibitory language and interprets it as requiring governments to carry out policy in a particular way, that too is necessarily
suspect. And the greater the specificity of the judicial decree, the harder it is to
argue that the requirement is anything but "policymaking in the guise of interpreting and applying" the Constitution."
VI
This brings me almost full circle, for the final criterion I'll discuss is consistency with precedent. I have emphasized that overruling precedent is something
quite different from overturning the results of the political process, and I don't
retreat from that proposition. But respect for precedent and respect for the political process do have something very important in common, and that is humility.
A sense of humility would remind a judge that members of Congress, state legislators, and other political officials have taken an oath to support the
Constitution, and that in our governmental system a judge should be slow to
reject the judgments they have made. But a sense of humility would also tell the
judge that his predecessors on the bench were attempting, in their own way, to
conscientiously apply the commands of the Constitution, and that he should also
be slow to repudiate their conclusions.
The problem, of course, is that, too often, these reminders will pull in opposite
directions. After decades of activist decisions, there can hardly be a single constitutional claim that will not have at least respectable support in Supreme Court
precedent. What should a judge (or Justice) do in a new case when precedent
points to an activist ruling, but all other criteria - whatever they might be - suggest that the political process should prevail?
41. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1922).
42. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion); but see Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1977).
43. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 E2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
44. For recent examples, see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996) (reversing district court order as "the ne
plus ultra of... a court's 'in the name of the Constitution, becom[ing] enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations'); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (reversing expansive district court remedial order in school
desegregation case).
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I wish I had an answer to that dilemma, but I do not, or at least not a complete
answer. A partial answer can be found in the common-law view of precedent. A
precedent is not an artifact, with qualities and dimensions that are forever fixed.
There is room for movement. Even the worst of activist decisions can be cabined
over time."5 On the other hand, if a decision is not cabined over time, perhaps it was
not so bad after all.46
Some of you Will hear in these words an echo of the writings of the great scholar
of the common law, Karl Llewellyn. That is no accident. The genius of the common
law tradition is to recognize that the wisdom of generations is a surer guide than
the wisdom of the judges who sit on a particular court at a particular moment.
Whether Roe v. Wade or United States v. Lopez is the activist decision that arouses
your ire, it should be some consolation to know that the process of the case law
system is, in Llewellyn's words, a process of "trial, and then correction."7
VII
To sum up, I'd like to leave you with these points.
First, if we're going to have useful discussions of judicial activism, we should
define the phenomenon objectively, and use the term exclusively to refer to decisions that expand the power of the judiciary over political institutions.
Second, we should not use the term to refer to decisions that overrule a court's
own precedents. Overruling may be right or wrong, but as a category it is quite distinct from rejecting the results of the political process.
Third, we may want to give more attention to the phenomenon of judicial intrusiveness - decisions that expand the power of courts over otherwise private decisionmaking.
Fourth, although we may not be able to agree on whether particular activist decisions are good or bad, we may be able to agree on the criteria for making that evaluation and how they should be used.
Fifth, constitutional law is case law, and case law brings into play the traditions
of the common law and a flexible view of precedent.
That leads to my final point. In offering this analysis, I have no doubt revealed
myself as someone with a generally conservative approach to legal issues. I will
not dispute that characterization. But I also believe that there is another aspect of
the law, particularly constitutional law, that transcends conventional liberal-conservative divisions, and I want to close by calling your attention to the eloquent articulation of that element by a jurist known to many of you here, former Chief Judge
Charles Clark of the Fifth Circuit. Judge Clark reminded us that courts do not just
decide cases or announce rules; they also engage in "moral persuasion through
45. For a recent example of the "cabining" process, see Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 122 S.Ct. 515
(2001); see also id. at 523-24 (Scalia, J., concurring) (acknowledging that "a broad interpretation" of the rationale
logically produce its application to the circumstances of this case," but rejecting
of an activist precedent "would ...
that interpretation).
46. The longer a particular interpretation has held sway, the more difficult it will be to argue that text, history,
and other criteria refute that conclusion in a way that leaves no room for doubt.
47. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADMnON: DECIDING APPEALS 397 (1960) (emphasis added). See
also Arthur D. Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology of IntercircuitConflicts, 63
U. Prrr. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
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[the] forceful, articulate declaration and justification of legal principle. '48 That is
exactly what the common law tradition calls for, and as long as courts set their
sights by that tradition, even the worst of judicial activism may become less
frightening.
48. Charles Clark, Foreword:The Role of the United States Court of Appealsfor the Fifth Circuitin the Civil
Rights Movement, 16 MIss. C. L. REv. 271,271 (1996).

